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NOTE
Money Doesn’t Grow on Trees: Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform is a Necessary Precursor
to Police Reform
Elizabeth Weaver*

I. INTRODUCTION
Communities are scrutinizing the credibility of law enforcement as
concerns associated with unfair treatment and police misconduct mount.1
Despite ever-present demands for reform, law enforcement policy and
practices continue to undercut efforts to build community relationships.2
Calls to defund police, whether by abolitionists or those who argue that
modern policing encompasses job duties law enforcement should never

*B.S., Boise State University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020–21; Note and Comment
Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021–22. I am grateful for the insight and guidance
provided by Associate Dean Ben Trachtenberg and the assistance of the Missouri Law
Review staff during the editing process.
1
Brandon Turchan, A high-profile police-involved shooting, civil unrest, and
officers’ perceptions of legitimacy: insights from a natural experiment, 17 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 507, 508 (2021) (“Legitimacy involves a willingness of
those subjected to an authority to recognize exercises of power and voluntarily comply
with orders and rules of society.”).
2
“If the public judges that the police exercise their authority using fair
procedures . . . the public will view the police as legitimate and will cooperate with
policing efforts. However, unfairness in the exercise of authority will lead to
alienation, defiance, and noncooperation.” Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role
of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 513, 514 (2003). Positive nonenforcement contact with law
enforcement can improve public attitudes toward police, including perceived
legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. Kyle Peyton et al., A field experiment on
community policing and police legitimacy, 116 (40) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 19894,
19894
(2019),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/116/40/19894.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2YD-EPFF].
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perform,3 entered mainstream conversations about police reform after the
death of Eric Garner in 2014, and reemerged when George Floyd was
murdered in 2020.4 While it is true that financial constraints can force
policy change, defunding the police could have unintended negative
consequences to the public by increasing police reliance on revenue from
civil asset forfeiture.5 At present, the United States Department of
Justice’s Asset Forfeiture Program provides a way for state and local
police departments to supplement budgets by seizing property from
individual citizens.6
Through civil asset forfeiture, law enforcement agencies can seize
cash, real estate, vehicles, and other property without filing criminal
charges against the property owner, much less securing a conviction.7
Civil asset forfeiture only requires probable cause – a reasonable belief
that the property in question was or could be used in the commission of a
crime.8 Forfeiture is lucrative for law enforcement agencies, and the
problem is growing. Between 1986 and 2014, federal forfeitures grew by
4667%, reaching $4.5 billion per year.9 In general, the agency responsible
for the seizure can keep up to 100 percent of the seized property or, more
A foundation of Abolitionist ideology is the belief that “procedural reforms
cannot fix policing because it is an inherently racist tool of social control.” Jamiles
Lartey & Annaliese Griffin, The Future of Policing, MARSHALL PROJECT: THE SYS.
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/23/the-future-ofpolicing [https://perma.cc/6R2Z-WVDW]. Abolitionists envision a society in which
the police are unnecessary because basic human needs like a living wage, safe
affordable housing and access to mental healthcare are universal.” Id.
4
Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CAL. L.
REV. 1781, 1814–15 (2020); Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police
Custody, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floydinvestigation.html [https://perma.cc/L8KG-LAR7] (last updated Nov. 1, 2021).
5
Akbar, supra note 4, at 1793.
6
About the Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP), U.S. DEP’T JUST. ASSET
FORFEITURE
PROGRAM,
https://www.justice.gov/afms/about-asset-forfeitureprogram-afp [https://perma.cc/Q9K4-MU89] (last updated Oct. 26, 2021).
7
Nick Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset
Forfeiture,
FORBES
(Nov.
12,
2020,
4:15
PM
EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/11/12/poll-most-americans-want-todefund-civil-forfeiture/?sh=5e67e4a057b5.
8
JONAH ENGLE, DRUG POL’Y ALL., ABOVE THE LAW: AN INVESTIGATION OF
CIVIL
ASSET
FORFEITURE
IN
CALIFORNIA
3
(2015),
https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Drug_Policy_Alliance_Above_the_Law_Ci
vil_Asset_Forfeiture_in_California.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPW5-53BK].
9
Isaac Safier, We Need to Talk About Civil Asset Forfeiture, NEW AM. (Sept.
10, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/we-need-talk-about-civil-assetforfeiture/ [https://perma.cc/7TKH-MPL6].
3
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often, the proceeds from its sale.10 For communities to view law
enforcement officers as legitimate actors who maintain order and
administer justice, officers’ actions must appear fair in the eyes of the
community;11 policies and procedures like civil asset forfeiture, however,
continue to erode public confidence in police.
Part II of this Note discusses the legal background of civil asset
forfeiture, including the United States Department of Justice and
Department of the Treasury’s Equitable Sharing Program. Part III
explores recent developments in civil asset forfeiture law, considering the
Supreme Court’s decision in Timbs v. Indiana and explaining why the
decision does not solve existing problems.12 Part IV explains the
relationship between budget reductions and increases in civil asset
forfeiture activity and explores the effectiveness of legislative roadblocks
to the misuse of civil forfeiture. Current policy motivates law enforcement
to pursue civil forfeiture. While defunding the police to push reform is
popular among abolitionists,13 until and unless civil forfeiture procedure
is reformed, such action will only negatively impact the public.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
October 2020 exhibited the fourteenth annual ‘Operation Rolling
Thunder,’14 a highway interdiction event in Spartanburg County, South
Carolina.15 Each year, for a week, officers focus their efforts on a stretch
of Interstate 85, hoping to seize drugs, guns, and money from drivers
committing minor traffic violations.16 Operation Rolling Thunder seized
10

Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset
Forfeiture, supra note 7.
11
Jacinta M. Gau, Consent Searches as a Threat to Procedural Justice and
Police Legitimacy: An Analysis of Consent Requests During Traffic Stops, 24 CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REV. 759, 760 (2013).
12
139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
13
See Akbar, supra note 4, at 1814.
14
The strategy of highway interdiction was created to counter the drug
trafficking organizations using the highway system to distribute contraband
throughout the county. Kevin M. Hood, Policy Safeguards and the Legitimacy of
Highway Interdiction (Dec. 2016) (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on
file with Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive).
15
Only on 7: A behind-the-scenes look at Operation Rolling Thunder, WSPA
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.wspa.com/news/crime/spartanburgco-sheriffs-office-to-give-update-on-operation-rolling-thunder/
[https://perma.cc/M2LW-RX64].
16
Id. (Only drivers committing traffic violations were pulled over. “Many were
caught speeding, following too closely, or improperly changing lanes.”).
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$319,595.00 in that one week.17 Officers extolled the fun they had
participating in Operation Rolling Thunder,18 noting that “nearly everyone
does something illegal if you follow them long enough.”19 Projects like
Operation Rolling Thunder rely heavily on civil asset forfeiture.20 To
initiate a forfeiture proceeding, law enforcement need only show probable
cause that the property in question was used in the commission of a
crime;21 it is not necessary to actually charge the owner of the property
with that crime. Forfeiture “inflicts the harsh punishments associated with
criminal proceedings without the constitutional protections guaranteed by
a criminal trial.”22 Even more concerning, participating agencies are
generally able to keep the property or, more often, the proceeds from its
sale.23

A. Sticky Fingers or the Midas Touch: Civil Asset Forfeiture Policy
and Procedure
Civil asset forfeiture exists to punish and deter criminal activity by
depriving criminals of property used in or acquired through illegal
activities.24 While criminal forfeiture happens after an individual has been
convicted of a crime as part of a criminal sanction,25 civil forfeiture is not
attached to a criminal proceeding.26 Supporters of civil asset forfeiture

17
Daryl James, Civil Liberty Suffers Bad Week on Interstate 85, INSIDE SOURCES
(Nov. 4, 2020), https://insidesources.com/civil-liberty-suffers-bad-week-oninterstate-85/ [https://perma.cc/RC33-C4V2].
18
“It’s been a blast,” stated Deputy Danny Swanger of the Cherokee County
Sheriff’s Office, explaining that he hopes to be part of the effort in the future. WSPA
NEWS, supra note 15.
19
BRIAN D. KELLY, PH.D., FIGHTING CRIME OR RAISING REVENUE? TESTING
OPPOSING
VIEWS
OF
FORFEITURE
4
(2019),
https://ij.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/Fighting-Crime-or-Raising-Revenue-7.20.2020revision.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN96-MW84].
20
Rachel J. Weiss, The Forfeiture Forecast After Timbs: Cloudy with a Chance
of Offender Ability to Pay, 61 B.C. L. REV. 3073, 3077 (2020); Sibilla, Poll: Most
Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset Forfeiture, supra note 7.
21
ENGLE, supra note 8, at 3.
22
Id.
23
Cassie Miller, Civil asset forfeiture: Unfair, undemocratic, and un-American,
S.
POVERTY
L.
CTR.
1
(Oct.
30,
2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policybrief_civil_asset_forfeiture_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8F3-YMY2].
24
About the Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP), supra note 6.
25
Weiss, supra note 20, at 3078.
26
Id.
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“believe that if the government were able to deprive narcotics dealers of
significant portions of the illegal gains they realize, this would have an
important deterrent effect and would stem the growth of drug
trafficking.”27 Since the beginning of the War on Drugs,28 “law
enforcement agencies have used civil asset forfeiture laws to strip
Americans of billions of dollars in cash, cars, real estate and other
assets.”29
In theory, forfeiture stalls crime by removing capital from individuals
participating in criminal activity.30 In reality, “increased forfeiture funds
ha[ve] no meaningful effect on crime fighting.” 31 Instead, forfeiture
distorts the relationship between the police and the public, encouraging
law enforcement to engage in behavior that maximizes profit rather than
ensuring public safety.32 In recent years, civil asset forfeiture has become
unquestionably profitable.33 States and the federal government have
seized a combined total of at least $68.8 billion over the last twenty years
through civil asset forfeiture.34 Because the law enforcement agency
responsible for seizing the property often keeps it, there is a strong
motivation to pursue forfeiture.35
27
Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives on Criminal Forfeiture, 97th Cong. 4 (March 9, 1982) (statement of
Jeffrey
Harris,
Deputy
Assoc.
Att’y
Gen.)
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/83805NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9THM-F6N8].
28
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 5 (2010) (“Most people assume
the War on Drugs was launched in response to the crisis caused by crack cocaine in
inner-city neighborhoods. This view holds that the racial disparities in drug
convictions and sentences, as well as the rapid explosion of the prison population,
reflect nothing more than the government’s zealous—but benign—efforts to address
rampant drug crime in poor, minority neighborhoods ... While it is true that the
publicity surrounding crack cocaine led to a dramatic increase in funding for the drug
war (as well as to sentencing policies that greatly exacerbated racial disparities in
incarceration rates), there is no truth to the notion that the War on Drugs was launched
in response to crack cocaine.”).
29
Miller, supra note 23.
30
About the Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP), supra note 6.
31
Kelly, supra note 19, at 3.
32
Miller, supra note 23.
33
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (noting that in 2014 alone, the
Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund took in $4.5 billion).
34
LISA KNEPPER ET AL., INST. FOR JUST., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 5 (3d ed. 2020) (noting that “because not all states provided
full data, this figure drastically underestimates forfeiture’s true scope.”).
35
Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (noting that the Federal Government and many
States permit 100 percent of forfeiture proceeds to flow directly to law enforcement).
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Ordinarily, when a state seeks to sanction an individual citizen, it will
proceed in personam by filing criminal charges.36 With civil forfeiture,
however, a state proceeds in rem, directly against the property.37 The
Supreme Court of the United States has routinely upheld in rem
proceedings that “enable the government to seize the property without any
pre-deprivation judicial process and to obtain forfeiture of the property
even when the owner is personally innocent.”38 Because forfeiture
proceedings are civil, certain due process protections that would
accompany a criminal prosecution are missing, including “the right to a
jury trial and a heightened standard of proof.”39 Civil asset forfeiture
generally requires only that the state show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the property at issue was, or might be used in the
commission of a crime.40 Because there is no criminal charge requirement,
eighty percent of individuals whose assets are seized by law enforcement
are not charged with a crime.41
When a civil forfeiture action is initiated, the state files an in rem
action against real or personal property, essentially accusing the property
of a crime.42 Historical forfeitures were vastly different than those allowed
under modern statutes.43 The evolution of criminal justice and asset
forfeiture statutes is now far removed from the “ancient notion of civil
forfeiture.”44 These historical statutes applied only to a few specific
offenses, such as customs violations and piracy,45 proceeding against
property when an individual responsible for a crime was outside the
personal jurisdiction of the United States.46 These statutes also typically
included only the instrumentalities of the crime, “not the derivative
proceeds of the crime.”47

36

Id. at 847.
Id.
38
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (Statement of Thomas, J.,
respecting the judgment).
39
Id. at 847–48.
40
18 U.S.C. § 981.
41
Miller, supra note 23.
42
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 80 (1993)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43
Id. at 85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.).
44
Id.
45
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 849 (2017) (Statement of Thomas, J.,
respecting the judgment).
46
Id. (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the judgment).
47
Id. (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the judgment).
37
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Current civil forfeiture laws are written, at least partially, to punish
property owners whose property has been used for criminal purposes.48
These statutes, passed by Congress under the 1970 Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, are one part of the larger War on
Drugs.49 Originally, Congress limited seizures to “drugs and all equipment
used in their manufacture and transit.”50 As Congress expanded the types
of assets subject to civil forfeiture, the connections between assets and
crime became more questionable.51 The 1984 Comprehensive Crime
Control Act further expanded civil forfeiture and earmarked all proceeds
from seizures for law enforcement purposes.52 In doing so, the law
“created a financial incentive for policing agencies to prioritize anti-drug
law enforcement.”53
Also missing from civil asset forfeiture, the concept of “innocent
until proven guilty.” Instead of the government having to prove that the
property was involved in a crime, the burden is on the property owner to
prove that the property is not guilty of a crime.54 Often, the value of the
seized property is less than the cost of hiring an attorney and paying court
fees,55 and challenging a cash seizure takes at least a year on average.56 As
a result, almost ninety percent of forfeitures are never challenged.57

48

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618–19 (1993).
Miller, supra note 23, at 2.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
ENGLE, supra note 8, at 3 (“Federal civil asset forfeiture violates due process
and property rights in numerous ways. There is no presumption of innocence; the legal
threshold for seizing private property is very low; the onus is on the owner to reclaim
their property; and no conviction is required for the government to forfeit private
property once it has been seized.”).
55
An investigation into civil forfeiture in Philadelphia revealed that half of all
seizures of cash were less than $192, but taking off the four days required, on average,
to attend court to resolve a forfeiture challenge would cost a minimum wage-earner
$232 in lost income. AM. C.L. UNION PA., GUILTY PROPERTY: HOW LAW
ENFORCEMENT TAKES $1 MILLION IN CASH FROM INNOCENT PHILADELPHIANS EVERY
YEAR
–
AND
GETS
AWAY
WITH
IT
8
(June
2015),
https://www.aclupa.org/sites/default/files/Guilty_Property_Report_-_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XX6V-7NTB].
56
Miller, supra note 23, at 2.
57
Miller, supra note 23, at 2 (“At the federal level, 88% of forfeitures go
uncontested.”).
49
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B. Do You Have Cash in the Vehicle: Targets of Civil Asset Forfeiture
People who deal primarily in cash are at increased danger of falling
victim to forfeiture. After the stock market crash in 2008, Lisa Olivia
Leonard, an agent for the Internal Revenue Service, began storing money
in safes.58 In 2013, Ms. Leonard sent a safe containing more than
$200,000 and a bill of sale for a property in Pennsylvania with her son to
purchase a home in Texas.59 The safe never made it.60 Ms. Leonard’s son
was pulled over and arrested for a traffic violation and suspicion of money
laundering when a police officer discovered the safe in the trunk of the
car.61 The officer contacted Ms. Leonard upon learning that the safe
belonged to her, but she refused him permission to open it.62 The officer
obtained a warrant and at later forfeiture proceedings, testified that in his
experience, “carrying large amounts of U.S. currency is commonly
associated with the illegal narcotics trade.”63 A Texas trial court awarded
the more than $200,000 to the state in a forfeiture proceeding, finding “a
substantial connection exist[ed] between the $201,100.00 and criminal
activity.”64
The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld the verdict, noting that under
a legal sufficiency standard, it would evaluate the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and consider whether the evidence “would
enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under
review.”65
The court held that the state presented “sufficient
circumstantial evidence to satisfy its burden” of proving that the money
was used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony.66 The
Supreme Court denied Ms. Leonard’s request for certiorari because her
attorneys argued, for the first time, that the seizure violated the Due
Process Clause.67 Justice Clarence Thomas, respecting the denial of
certiorari because the case was not yet ripe, nonetheless penned an
excoriating six-page indictment of modern civil asset forfeiture
58
$201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State, No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL
4312536, at *1 (Tex. App. July 16, 2015).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. James Leonard was convicted of narcotics-related crimes in 2008 and
2011. Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at *2 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005).
66
Id.
67
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017).
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procedure.68 “This system – where police can seize property with limited
judicial oversight and retain it for their own use – has led to egregious and
well-chronicled abuses.”69
Civil forfeiture is not limited to drug kingpins and cartels and does
not prioritize only netting high-dollar seizures and dismantling criminal
enterprises.70 Instead,
[F]orfeiture operations frequently target the poor and other groups
least able to defend their interests in forfeiture proceedings...
Perversely, these same groups are often the most burdened by
forfeiture. They are more likely to use cash than alternative forms of
payment, like credit cards, which may be less susceptible to forfeiture.
And they are more likely to suffer in their daily lives while they litigate
for the return of a critical item of property, such as a car or home.71

Police have broad discretion in choosing which property to seize,
which results in a disproportionate impact on racial minorities.72 In 2016,
the Nevada Policy Research Institute studied forfeitures in Las Vegas,
noting that sixty-six percent of the forfeitures analyzed happened in onequarter of the zip codes in Las Vegas: neighborhoods that were
“predominantly minority and low-income.”73 The average value of a state
seizure in California in 2013 was just over $5,000.74 In 1992, ninety-four
percent of California forfeitures were valued at $5,000 or less.75 Forfeiture
can even strip owners of their homes. In Philadelphia, where nearly 300
homes are seized each year, African Americans make up less than half of

68

Id.
“According to one nationally publicized report, for example, police in the
town of Tenaha, Texas, regularly seized the property of out-of-town drivers passing
through and collaborated with the district attorney to coerce them into signing waivers
of their property rights. In one case, local officials threatened to file unsubstantiated
felony charges against a Latino driver and his girlfriend and to place their children in
foster care unless they signed a waiver. In another, they seized a black plant worker's
car and all his property (including cash he planned to use for dental work), jailed him
for a night, forced him to sign away his property, and then released him on the side of
the road without a phone or money. He was forced to walk to a Wal–Mart, where he
borrowed a stranger's phone to call his mother, who had to rent a car to pick him up.”
Id. at 848 (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the judgment).
70
GUILTY PROPERTY, supra note 55.
71
Leonard, 137 S.Ct at 848 (Statement of Thomas, J., respecting the judgment).
72
Miller, supra note 23, at 2.
73
Safier, supra note 9.
74
ENGLE, supra note 8.
75
Id.
69
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the population but suffer sixty-three percent of home seizures and seventyone percent of cash forfeitures unaccompanied by a conviction.76

C. Pennies from Heaven: Law Enforcement Use of Forfeiture Funds
The federal government and most states allow law enforcement
agencies to retain up to 100% of the proceeds from forfeiture property. 77
Allowing law enforcement to “self-finance without legislative approval or
oversight” creates a clear incentive to pursue forfeiture,78 with agencies
viewing forfeiture funds as “pennies from heaven.”79 The Departments of
Justice and the Treasury encourage use of the Equitable Sharing Program
(“the Program”) to supplement and enhance law enforcement agency
resources.80 The Program allows agencies in states with restrictive
forfeiture laws to circumvent state law and retain seized funds through a
procedure called adoption.81 According to the Department of Justice, an
adoption “occurs when a state or federal law enforcement agency seizes
property under state law, without federal oversight or involvement, and
requests that a federal agency take the seized asset into its custody and
proceed to forfeit the asset under federal law.”82
Research shows that law enforcement agencies in states with
restrictive forfeiture laws are more likely to participate in the equitable
sharing program.83 In 2015, then-Attorney General Eric Holder limited
the scope of the DOJ’s equitable sharing program, prohibiting most
adoptions of state-seized property.84 Those reforms were short-lived;

76

Miller, supra note 23, at 2.
Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset
Forfeiture, supra note 7.
78
Id.
79
Former Columbia Missouri Chief of Police Ken Burton, describing using
forfeiture funds, “it’s kind of like pennies from heaven, you know it gets you a toy or
something. . . .” Citizens For Justice, “Pennies From Heaven;” Police Chief Talks
Asset
Forfeiture,
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
19,
2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipHUN-xLLms [https://perma.cc/BU2H-93SZ].
80
U.S. DEP’T JUST. & U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE SHARING FOR
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 13 (2018),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download
[https://perma.cc/243R-KD5K].
81
ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL, at ch. 3 § II (2021).
82
Id.
83
Miller, supra note 23, at 3.
84
Id.
77
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Attorney General Jeff Sessions completely reversed them within months
of his appointment.85
According to the Department of Justice, “[a]sset forfeiture is a
powerful tool that provides valuable resources to state and local law
enforcement that may not have otherwise been available.” 86 Touting the
additional benefits of forfeiture, the Departments of Justice and the
Treasury encourage use of the Program to “enhance cooperation amongst
federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement by providing valuable
additional resources to state and local law enforcement agencies.”87 To
receive Program payments, state and local law enforcement agencies must
assist in a law enforcement effort that results in a federal forfeiture, either
by cooperating with a federal agency or by pursuing adoption.88
Regardless of the division of effort between state and federal agencies
related to a seizure, under the Program, the minimum federal share is 20
percent.89
Even in states that have tried to reduce abusive forfeiture practices,
federal law allows agencies to partner with a federal agency and still retain
up to eighty percent of the forfeited property.90 Missouri, for example,
designates forfeiture proceeds “for school purposes only.” 91 Because of
equitable sharing, however, law enforcement agencies can circumvent this
restriction by allowing a federal agency to “adopt” the forfeiture and
proceeding under federal law.92 Between 1993 and 2001, Missouri gained
forty-one million dollars from forfeiture actions, but only twelve million
made it to schools.93 Missouri took steps to close the forfeiture loophole
and prevent policing for profit, but the United States government
incentivizes departments to ignore state regulations by partnering with
federal agencies.94
Equitable sharing “undermines states’ attempts to regulate forfeiture,
and its extensive use, according to criminologists, shows that police

85

Id. at 3–4.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GUIDE TO EQUITABLE
SHARING FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, supra note
80.
87
Id. at 1.
88
Id. at 7.
89
Id. at 9.
90
Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset
Forfeiture, supra note 7.
91
Miller, supra note 23, at 3.
92
ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL, supra note 81.
93
Miller, supra note 23, at 3.
94
Id.
86
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agencies ‘engage in forfeiture practices that maximize their potential for
revenue generation.’”95 Between 2014 and 2020, the Justice Department
distributed more than $1.5 billion in equitable sharing funds to local and
state law enforcement agencies.96 Police departments have become
increasingly reliant on profits from civil asset forfeiture, with devastating
results.97 In a study of 1,400 municipal and county law enforcement
agencies, more than sixty percent reported that forfeiture revenue was a
necessary part of their budgets, suggesting that these departments
themselves had become “addicted to the drug war.”98

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
States have taken action to combat the pervasive abuse of civil asset
forfeiture with varying levels of success. When a forfeiture is at least
partially punitive,99 the Supreme Court has held that it is a fine for
purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.100 The
Court addressed contemporary issues related to civil forfeiture in 2019
with Timbs v. Indiana but focused only on whether the Excessive Fines
Clause was incorporated against the states.101
The Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered America’s
federalist system, extending federal protections to individuals prosecuted
by the states.102 A protection provided in the Bill of Rights is applicable
to the states, or incorporated, if it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered
liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”103 Rights
that are incorporated are “enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal
95

Id.
Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress To Abolish Civil Asset
Forfeiture, supra note 7.
97
Miller, supra note 23, at 2.
98
Id. The percentage of police budgets that derive from civil asset forfeiture
varies widely. See id. at 4. Fontana, Calif. is a typical example. Safier, supra note 9.
In 2019 the Fontana police department received $3.14 million in equitable
sharing payments in fiscal year 2019, roughly 5 percent as much as from the city
budget. Id. (data regarding local police or sheriff’s department collections from
participating in equitable sharing programs in 2019 available at Justice.gov).
99
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (stating that “a civil
sanction, like in rem forfeiture is punitive when it cannot ‘fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose.’”).
100
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019); Austin, 509 U.S. at 604.
101
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
102
Id. at 687.
103
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
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rights against federal encroachment.”104 When a Bill of Rights protection
is incorporated, “there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct
it prohibits or requires.”105

A. Timbs v. Indiana
In 2013, Tyson Timbs was arrested in Marion, Indiana.106 He pleaded
guilty to drug and theft-related charges.107 The court could have fined Mr.
Timbs up to $10,000, but instead “sentenced him to one year of home
detention and five years of probation, which included a court-supervised
addiction treatment program.”108 Mr. Timbs was required to pay fees and
court costs totaling just over $1200.109 Shortly before his arrest, Mr. Timbs
received a large payout from his father’s life insurance policy.110 With the
money he received, Mr. Timbs purchased a Land Rover SUV for
approximately $42,000.111
When Mr. Timbs was arrested, Indiana seized the Land Rover and
hired a private law firm to bring a civil forfeiture action against the SUV,
alleging that it had been used to transport heroin.112 Once Mr. Timbs
pleaded guilty in the criminal case, the trial court considered the forfeiture
demand, finding that although Mr. Timbs’s vehicle was used to facilitate
criminal activity, it could not be forfeited because the value of the vehicle
was more than four times the maximum monetary fee that could have been
levied against Mr. Timbs for his criminal conviction. 113 The trial court
noted that the forfeiture of the Land Rover would have been “grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of Mr. Timbs’s offense, hence
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause.”114 The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling,
but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Excessive Fines

104

Id. at 765; Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687.
106
Sam Gedge, Tyson Timbs Gets His Car Back!, INST. FOR JUST. (Aug. 2020),
https://ij.org/ll/august-2020-issue-29-volume-4/tyson-timbs-gets-his-car-back/
[https://perma.cc/VV8Q-GXZU].
107
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
105

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 14

356

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Clause constrained only federal action and was inapplicable to state
actions.115
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to
determine whether the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an
“incorporated” protection applicable to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.116 The Court determined that the
protection against excessive fines, like that against excessive bail and cruel
and unusual punishment, “guards against abuses of government’s punitive
or criminal-law-enforcement authority.”117 Holding that the safeguard
against excessive fines is “fundamental to [a] scheme of ordered liberty,”
the Court deemed the Excessive Fines Clause incorporated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.118
The Court explained that the Eighth Amendment placed limitations
on the “power of those entrusted with the criminal-law function of
government.”119 The main issue in Timbs was the phrase “nor excessive
fines imposed,” which the Court said “limits the government’s power to
exact payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some
offense.’”120 Indiana argued not that the Excessive Fines Clause was not
incorporated against the states, but rather that the Excessive Fines Clause
did not apply to civil in rem forfeitures because the Clause’s application
to such forfeitures is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted.121 The Court
previously held that the Clause does apply to civil in rem procedures when
those procedures are at least partially punitive.122 Given the lack of
Supreme Court precedent related to civil asset forfeiture, the decision in
Timbs brought with it a flurry of speculation about a possible end to the
practice.123 However, the Court did not address whether civil forfeiture in

115

Id.
Id. at 686. When ratified, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal
Government. Id. at 687. Amendments adopted after the Civil War changed the federal
system, incorporating the protections contained in the Bill of Rights against the states.
Id. A protection laid out by the Bill of Rights is applicable to the states when it is
“fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nations’s
history and tradition.” Id.
117
Id. at 686.
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Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689.
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Id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
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See Timbs v. Indiana: The End of Civil Asset Forfeiture?, HARVARD. C.R.C.L. L. REV. AMICUS BLOG (Oct. 4, 2018), https://harvardcrcl.org/timbs-v-indianathe-end-of-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/ULR2-Q9LD].
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its current state was a facially unconstitutional overreach.124 The Court in
Timbs did not decide that “civil forfeitures are tantamount to fines—
thereby leaving it for another court, in another case to further develop
Excessive Fines Clause jurisprudence.”125
Given that “the onus is on lower courts to breathe life into the
Excessive Fines Clause by developing rules to determine when economic
sanctions, including forfeitures, are unconstitutionally excessive,” 126 the
Indiana Supreme Court, on remand, created a new standard to inform its
state courts.127 Because Indiana’s forfeiture statute is punitive,128 placing
it firmly under the purview of the Excessive Fines Clause, the court
refused to agree with the State’s arguments that “if the property was an
instrument of crime, then its forfeiture is not excessive—full stop.”129
Instead, the court agreed with Mr. Timbs, and earlier U.S. Supreme Court
precedent,130 that the Excessive Fines Clause “includes both an
instrumentality limitation and a proportionality limitation.”131 The Indiana
Supreme Court created a test for determining if a forfeiture violates the
Excessive Fines Clause by asking (1) whether the property was an
instrumentality of the crime in question, and (2) whether the value of the
forfeited property is proportional to the criminal offense in question. 132
Ultimately, the court determined that “an instrumentality forfeiture is
excessive if—based on the totality of the circumstances—the harshness of
punishment is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offenses and the
claimant’s culpability.”133
The Indiana Supreme Court remanded Timbs’s case to the trial court
to determine, under the new instrumentality and proportionality test,
124

Weiss, supra note 20, at 3076.
Id.
126
Sidebar: Curbing “Excessive” Forfeitures, INST. FOR JUST.,
https://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit-3/pfp3content/forfeiture-is-lucrative-forgovernments-nationwide/curbing-excessive-forfeitures/
[https://perma.cc/5ZX4LTM6] (last visited Nov. 20, 2021).
127
State v. Timbs, 134 N.E. 3d 12, 27 (2019); KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 34, at
22.
128
IND. CODE § 34-24-1-1 (2021).
129
Timbs, 134 N.E.3d at 24.
130
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1993); United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 343–43 (1998).
131
Timbs, 134 N.E.3d at 24.
132
Id. at 28–35.
133
Id. at 35. The court noted as well that while the gross-disproportionality
inquiry for an in personam forfeiture considers the whole amount of the forfeiture, the
inquiry for in rem forfeitures focuses only on the harshness of the punishment that the
forfeiture imposes. Id.
125
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whether the forfeiture of Timbs’s vehicle was excessive.134 Once again,
the trial court ruled in favor of Timbs, that the forfeiture of his $42,000
Land Rover was grossly disproportionate to the maximum $10,000 fine he
could have, but did not, receive as punishment for his offense.135 On May
26, 2020, Indiana law enforcement returned Mr. Timbs’s vehicle to him,
nearly seven years after it was first seized.136

B. Change You Can Take to the Bank: Elimination of Civil Forfeiture
in New Mexico
In 2015, New Mexico completely and unequivocally abolished civil
asset forfeiture, requiring law enforcement agencies to secure a criminal
conviction before forfeiting property.137 The state made statutory changes
to “ensure that only criminal forfeiture is allowed in [New Mexico] and
only pursuant to state law.”138 Not only did New Mexico restrict its use of
forfeiture to criminal cases; it also raised the burden of proof on the state
from a preponderance of the evidence, now requiring clear and convincing
evidence that the property is substantially related to the commission of a
criminal offense.139
Most importantly, New Mexico effectively disqualified state and
local law enforcement agencies from participating in the Federal Equitable
Sharing Program.140 Before this change, New Mexico participated heavily
in the Program.141 Between 2000 and 2013, New Mexico received
$41,239,856 in equitable sharing funds from the Department of Justice and
134

Id. at 39.
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment at 10–12, State v. Timbs,
134 N.E.3d 12 (Ind. 2019) (No. 27D01-1308-MI-92), available at https://ij.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Findings-of-Fact-Conclusions-an.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PN79-9ES3].
136
John Kramer, Indiana Returns Vehicle in Landmark Civil Forfeiture Case,
But Government Continues its Appeal, INST. FOR JUST. (May 27, 2020),
https://ij.org/press-release/indiana-returns-vehicle-in-landmark-civil-forfeiture-casebut-government-continues-its-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/3UKW-2J3A].
137
Nick Sibilla, When New Mexico Abolished Civil Forfeiture 5 Years Ago, Cops
Predicted Crime Would Soar. It Didn’t., FORBES (Dec. 17, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2020/12/17/when-new-mexico-abolishedcivil-forfeiture-5-years-ago-cops-predicted-crime-would-soar-itdidnt/?sh=63bb3c1f2729.
138
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-2(A)(6) (2019).
139
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4(A)(3).
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DICK M. CARPENTER ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL
ASSET FORFEITURE 109 (Inst. for Just., 2d ed. 2015).
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another $29,170,000 from the Department of the Treasury.142 Now, law
enforcement is prohibited from transferring property valued at less than
$50,000 to federal agencies for adoption, and state law requires that all
proceeds go to the state general fund.143 Because the Program requires
that monies disbursed through equitable sharing be spent only by the law
enforcement agency that participated in the forfeiture, New Mexico’s state
laws essentially prohibit its law enforcement agencies from participating
in the Program.144

IV. DISCUSSION
Although civil forfeiture was originally established as a tool to aid
law enforcement in the War on Drugs, it has provided little assistance.
Narcotics are widely available, and overdose deaths reach new highs every
year; drugs have won.145 Instead of allowing civil asset forfeitures to
continue unchecked, state and federal law should place conditions on
equitable sharing procedures to force state and local departments to make
meaningful change and to create more consistent police policy nationwide.
State agencies have the ability to circumvent state law, and because they
are powerful opponents to legislative change at the state level, the
Department of Justice should place conditions on equitable sharing that
constrain police behavior that negatively impacts public trust in law
enforcement.

A. Belt Tightening Gone Wrong: Collateral Consequences of Police
Budget Reduction
When police budgets are reduced, civil asset forfeiture increases.146
Equitable sharing gives law enforcement a mechanism by which agencies
can “make up” for budget shortfalls without the stricture created by a
governing body. In some cases, local governments actually reduce police
budgets by the amount generated in forfeiture revenue in prior years,
expecting the revenue to continue.147 A comprehensive study of forfeiture
in Southern California cities noted that “forfeiture revenue spike[d]
142
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Id.
144
Id.
145
See Drugs Win Drug War, THE ONION, January 10, 1998.
146
Learn About the Impact of Civil Asset Forfeiture, NAT’L POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, https://www.nlg-npap.org/civil-asset-forfeiture/ (last
visited Mar. 13, 2021).
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immediately after police budgets were cut.”148 Regardless of why police
budgets might be reduced, under the current statutory scheme, law
enforcement agencies can simply replace lost funding by aggressively
pursuing civil asset forfeiture.149
Forfeiture operations often target areas with high levels of poverty,
likely because citizens are disempowered from advocating for themselves,
police departments in those areas have limited funding, and forfeiture can
generate needed revenue.150 “When local economies suffer, equitable
sharing activities increase, suggesting that police make greater use of
forfeiture when local budgets are tight.”151 As a result, civil forfeiture has
fundamentally restructured law enforcement priorities.152 Instead of
focusing effort and resources on dangerous criminals, law enforcement
agencies often look for opportunities to seize assets that promise lucrative
returns.153 Public statements expressing a desire to compensate for
budgetary shortages by implementing enforcement-based profit
generation further complicate the relationship between police and the
public.154 Law enforcement personnel exercise a great deal of discretion
when deciding which vehicles to stop and which to search.155 The
unfortunate reality is that broad discretion in highway interdiction efforts
results in a disparate impact on people of color.156 The link between
increased forfeiture and worsening economic conditions suggests that law
enforcement agencies use forfeiture less to fight crime than to raise
revenue, with the most vulnerable communities feeling the squeeze.157
As cities consider reducing law enforcement funding, a 2020 poll
shows that Americans largely disfavor policies that allow police
148
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departments to “self-fund” through asset seizure.158 Nevertheless, fines
and fees are “politically easier to impose” than new or increased taxes, so
state and local governments have become increasingly dependent on them
as a way to generate revenue.159
The protection against excessive fines has been a constant shield
throughout Anglo-American history: Exorbitant tolls undermine other
constitutional liberties. Excessive fines can be used, for example, to
retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies. Even absent a
political motive, fines may be employed in a measure out of accord
with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence, for fines are a source
of revenue, while other forms of punishment cost a state money.160

Some states, like Missouri, require forfeiture funds to be directed to
public education.161 However, federal programs allow law enforcement
agencies to skirt state law to reap profits off the backs of citizens.162

B. The New Mexico Example
Contrary to unsupported claims that New Mexico’s elimination of
civil asset forfeiture would increase crime, rates of arrest and crime
remained steady after the reform.163 These data strongly suggest that
forfeiture is “not an essential crimefighting tool and law enforcement
agencies can fulfill their mission without it.” 164 When the state legislature
unanimously approved these reforms, New Mexico law enforcement
predicted a rise in crime, but none came.165 If those predictions had been
accurate, data would show “(1) a significant increase in the number of
158
Sibilla, Poll: Most Americans Want Congress to Abolish Civil Forfeiture,
supra note 7.
159
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (No. 17-1091).
160
Id.; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 n.9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia,
J.) (it makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State
stands to benefit).
161
Chelsea Voronoff, Uncle Sam Is Helping Missouri Cops Steal From the
State’s Public Education Fund, ACLU (May 21, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police/uncle-sam-helpingmissouri-cops-steal-states-public [https://perma.cc/V3ZG-TRPL].
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How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture
as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392 (2018).
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Id.
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Sibilla, When New Mexico Abolished Civil Forfeiture 5 Years Ago, Cops
Predicted Crime Would Soar. It Didn’t., supra note 137.
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crimes committed because forfeiture is no longer deterring crime, and (2)
a significant decrease in the number of arrests because police are less able
to solve crimes without forfeiture.”166 Instead, data comparing monthly
crime rates in New Mexico to those in Colorado and Texas, both before
and after reform, shows no significant increase in crime that could be
associated with civil forfeiture reforms.167
These results fly in the face of claims that forfeiture reform
jeopardizes community safety and undercuts law enforcement efforts.168
Based on the results in New Mexico, it is likely that law enforcement
agencies can accomplish their missions of crime control and public safety
without the additional revenue generated by civil asset forfeiture.169 State
legislatures nationwide should take New Mexico’s success as a cue to
implement similar changes. The Equitable Sharing Program can provide
funds to state and local law enforcement agencies only when state law
permits such disbursement.170

C. Passing the Buck: How Defunding the Police will Increase Civil
Asset Forfeiture
Without practical constraints, simply defunding the police at the state
or local level will likely increase civil asset forfeiture. As an alternative,
Congress can place conditions on federal funding disbursed through the
Program to force policy change. As municipalities feel the squeeze of
economic stress, federal funding will become more important than ever.
Grant programs from federal departments like the Department of Justice
and the Department of Agriculture provide communities with funds to hire
more police, upgrade law enforcement facilities, and purchase

166

KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 34.
The Institute for Justice performed a difference-in-differences analysis,
comparing the average change in crime rates in the two years before and after the
reforms were implemented. KNEPPER ET AL., supra note 34. Additionally, it
performed an interrupted time series analysis, comparing the change in crime rates
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data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program showing five measures of
crime: the total number of crimes committed, all arrests, arrests for driving under the
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equipment.171 Many of those grant programs are designed in ways that
“incentivize harmful policing and undermine local and state political
accountability;”172 however, the Federal Government can choose to place
restrictions on federal funds. Congress has limited authority to compel
change to state and local law enforcement policy, but it can exert influence
by attaching conditions to funds. 173 Short of abolishing civil forfeiture
completely, congress should place “strings” on federal equitable sharing
funds.
Congress should implement change to the Program in four important
ways: enforcing prohibitions against budget supplanting, raising the
minimum amount of cash eligible for seizure, requiring transparent
forfeiture reporting, and ensuring that the value of seized property does
not exceed the maximum fine for the criminal violation the property is
allegedly associated with, even if the property owner is not charged with
a crime. All forfeitures should be connected to criminal activity in an
unambiguous and meaningful way, even if they are civil rather than
criminal.
The ongoing national debate about police practices should create an
imperative among legislators to facilitate efforts to build public confidence
in law enforcement.174 States generally have broad authority to create
policy to regulate state and local law enforcement agencies.175 Congress,
on the other hand, can only create legislation under an enumerated power
contained in the Constitution. 176 Federal legislation aimed at improving
community trust in police, however, can still work to improve policecommunity relations.177
Congress has historically used the spending power and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to address local law enforcement issues.178
Through the Spending Clause,179 Congress may influence policy by

171
Brian Naylor, How Federal Dollars Fund Local Police, NPR (June 9, 2020,
5:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/872387351/how-federal-dollars-fundlocal-police [https://perma.cc/64TT-ZHWB].
172
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2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43904.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y9B-P9QE].
174
Id.
175
Id.; see Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014).
176
CONG. RSCH. SERV., PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION
FOR POLICYMAKERS, supra note 173.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.1

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 14

364

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds.180 Generally, these
conditions require compliance with “statutory or administrative
directives,” and they could apply to any entity using forfeiture funds.181
The conditions placed on federal funding must be “in pursuit of the general
welfare,”182 unambiguous,183 “germane” to the federal interest or aim, 184
and not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution. 185 Because funding
through the Program is already limited as to its uses, and strictly prohibits
budgetary supplanting, adding requirements for compliance with the
Excessive Fines Clause and raising the minimum amount eligible for
federal adoption would not be unconstitutionally coercive.186

V. CONCLUSION
Police reform is a lofty goal that must be achieved through small,
manageable, and politically favorable steps. Ideally, state legislatures will
prioritize citizens’ ability to be secure in their property above the “pennies
from heaven” that civil forfeiture provides. Changing the way federal
funds are disbursed to state and local police departments can not only serve
as an impetus for change but also create more congruent law enforcement
policies across the country.
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